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The thesis considers battle termination (a unit reaching
its so-called "breakpoint") in ground combat as a rational
decision process. A commander's decision to break contact
with an enemy force and withdraw from the battlefield is
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the future with no assumption about combat dynamics. The
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past there have been many attempts to model land
combat. Two reasons for attempting to model this process
are: (1) to learn more about the actual dynamics of land
combat and (2) to aid in predicting outcomes of possible
future conflicts. The models that have been developed vary
greatly in both type and complexity. Some of the more
recent models, with the aid of digital computers, are
capable of considering many variables in great detail
[Refs. 9, 10, 17, 35, and 36]. As the trend toward more
complex and detailed models progresses, even more subjective
variables such as suppression and intervisibility are being
quantified and included in models. With all the emphasis on
more realistic and detailed models there is one area that
has been somewhat neglected.
A neglected area in the modelling of land combat is the
establishment of criteria for battle termination. In many
models the only criterion for terminating a battle is the
fractional-casualties suffered by the participants [Ref. 17].
Other models are even less sophisticated in that the criter-
ion for battle termination is the annihilation of one of the
opposing forces. The reasons for using casualties as the sole
criterion for battle termination are not completely known but
some of the reasons will be discussed later.
In actual battles several different events might cause
battle termination. If one of the opposing forces is

annihilated, then the battle ends; however, this is a rare
event essentially never observed in combat with a few excep-
tions (e.g. Iwo Jima, Alamo, etc.). If one of the opposing
forces surrenders unconditionally, the battle will also
terminate. The third and most common event which will
result in battle termination is that of one opposing force
breaking contact with the enemy and withdrawing from the
battlefield [Ref. 41]. Naturally there are other possible
events which might result in battle termination, but they
will not be considered here.
The event of particular interst in this analysis is that
of one opposing force breaking contact with the enemy and
withdrav/ing from the battlefield. There are numerous reasons
[Ref. 30] why this event might occur and several are as
follows
:
1. To draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.
2. To permit the use of the unit elsewhere.
3. To gain time.
4. To conform to movements of friendly troops.
5. To shorten lines of communication.
6. To avoid further combat.
Of the six reasons listed the only one this analysis will
consider is the last one.
At this point it is worthwhile to introduce the concept
of a breakpoint . In military literature there are several
different definitions for the term breakpoint. For the
purposes of further discussion a breakpoint is defined to

be that state of a battle which a unit considers itself no
longer capable of performing its mission and as a result
elects to break contact with the enemy and withdraw from the
battlefield. Therefore, when a unit withdraws from the
battle strictly to avoid further combat, the unit is con-
sidered to have reached its breakpoint. A unit might never
reach its breakpoint in some tactical situations that do
not allow for withdrawal. There might be other reasons
(i.e., physical constraints or lack of morale) why with-
drawal is unlikely, and the unit might elect to surrender,
but those situations are not within the scope of this thesis.
With the given definition of breakpoint in mind this
analysis will investigate essentially the following three
questions
:
1. When does a unit reach its breakpoint?
2. What are some of the significant variables that cause
a unit to reach its breakpoint?
3. What approaches might be taken to model a unit's
breakpoint?
The motivation for gaining insight into the breakpoint
is to provide new approaches to modelling the battle
termination process. The reasons that the modelling of
battle termination is important are: (1) battle termination
sub-models are widely used in large unit combat models such
as ATLAS and VECTOR- I I [Refs. 17 and 35] and, (2) such sub-
models may have a major influence on optimal time-squential
tactical allocation strategies [Refs. 32 and 33].
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II. MODELLING THE BREAKPOINT AS A FUNCTION
OF FRACTIONAL CASUALTIES
In many current land combat models a unit's breakpoint
is determined by the percentage of casualties sustained by
that unit [Refs. 17 and 35]. Two inherent assumptions in
these models are that a unit's effectiveness decreases as
the number of casualties increase and a unit becomes more
likely to reach its breakpoint as it's relative effectiveness
becomes less. Both of the assumptions seem intuitively
appealing and would certainly be agreed upon by the majority
of the military community. The point of contention, however,
is the explicit relationship between unit effectiveness,
casualties, and the breakpoint. Also it might be proper at
this point to question the existence of such a relationship
without consideration of other intervening variables. The
discussion in this section will center around the relation-
ship between battle casualties and unit effectiveness and
the validity of present breakpoint hypotheses.
A. BATTLE CASUALTIES AS A MEASURE OF LOSS
OF UNIT EFFECTIVENESS
There have been numerous studies on battle casualties
from past wars. In many cases the studies were done to gain
insight into the casualty process itself. One such study
was done by Beebe and DeBakey [Ref. 1] on battle casualties
suffered by the U.S. Army in WW II. They listed the follow-




1. Ratio of enemy to U.S. strength
2. Weapons employed, and ratio of enemy to U.S. fire
power
3. Experience and training of troops, both in general
and in particular types of combat
4. Terrain
5. Tactical advantage and excellence of plan, enemy and
U.S.
a. Availability of prepared positions
b. Possession of terrain advantages, e.g. high ground
c. Intelligence
6. Tactical and strategic support, both air and naval
7. Logistic support
The above list illustrates the fact that the number of
casualties suffered by a unit during any period of time is
dependent on numerous variables. This suggests that it-
is not sufficient to talk about only the number of casualty
suffered by a unit without putting that number into the con-
text of a time frame and tactical situation. Certainly, one
would not equate equally the combat effectiveness of an
infantry platoon which had suffered one casualty per day for
a period of ten days from sniper fire to that of the same
platoon which had suffered ten casualties in a period of
five minutes from a charging enemy company. If one is
forced to relate casualties and unit combat effectiveness
only in the context of a specific time frame and tactical
-situation then it is legitimate to ask if there are any
12

general relationships which are universally applicable. In
a study done by Best [Ref. 3] three general conclusions were
cited:
1. Casualties are essential yet variously contingent
determinants of combat, for they tend to diminish, con-
strain, depress, or derange the adaptive application of
force to differing degrees in different situations;
therefore, they (a) reduce the tempo of tactical develop-
ment to varying extents, and (b) exert a varying influence
on the tactical outcome - disproportionate and decisive,
proportionate and substantial, or none at all.
2. Casualties are a qualitatively, but not quantitatively
,
predictable diffuse depressant in overall operational
effect.
3. Quantitative regularities in aggregated casualty rates
are mainly expressions of the prevailing intensity of
combat. Although in part determined by casualties, pre-
vailing intensity is in greater part determined by other
constraints and restraints on the functioning of tactical
systems: uncertainty and risk; delays and deficiencies in
communications, and logistic insufficiencies.
Although the conclusions reached by Best provide no
explicit relationship between casualties and unit effective-
ness, they do emphasize the variance that exists in the
effect of casualties on operational effectiveness. It would
appear that any quantitative analysis on the relationship
between casualties and unit effectiveness is, at least,
partially restricted to specific types of situations. This
would require knowing what variables are necessary to
classify a type of situation and the value of these vari-
ables for each specific situation. For example, it might be
important in performing the analysis to know (a) whether
the unit in question was attacking or defending, (b) the
amount of training received, (c) the terrain occupied and
fired over, and (d) the means available to evacuate
13

casualties. These variables are only a few of the many
variables which could be considered in trying to establish
a "type" of situation.
The danger of specifying too many variables arises. If
it requires thirty variables to categorize a "type" of
situation then each situation would be a unique "type" and
quantitative analysis would not be feasible. Another
approach to accessing the loss of combat effectiveness due
to casualties is a subjective one. This approach entails
the collection of expert opinion from men experienced in
land combat. The subjective opinions of military men on
how effective a unit is with varying casualty percentages
would have to be consolidated to form an estimate. This
type of an approach was taken by Spring and Miller [Ref. 29]
when they developed a graph depicting the "Relationship
between an attacking infantry company's percentage casual-
ties and the percentage of its surviving riflemen that are
ineffective . . .". There are also some graphs in FM105-5
[Ref. 21] that show the relationship between percentage
casualties and ineffective time for attaching and defending
units. At present it appears that one is forced either to
refer to a specific combat situation or to accept estimates
based on military judgement when one wishes to quantify the
loss of combat effectiveness due to casualties.
B. PRESENT METHODOLOGY FOR MODELLING BREAKPOINTS
With the realization that not many land battles are
fought until one side or the other is annihilated, many
14

analytic combat models and computer combat simulations have
been provided with rules for terminating the battle. The
most common rule is to assign (either stochastically or
deterministically) both sides a breakpoint based on a casualty
fraction value [Refs. 17 and 35]. This implies that when a
unit suffers a fraction of casualties equal to its break-
point state the unit becomes ineffective (either surrenders
or withdraws from the battlefield) and the battle is stopped.
Usually the side which reaches its breakpoint first is
considered to be the loser. The casualty fraction is
x (t)defined as (1 - —s—-) where x is the initial number of
x o
o
combatants in unit X at the start of the battle and x(t)
is the number of remaining combatants (i.e., ncn-casualties
at some time t during the battle) . If the breakpoint is
defined as B (where <_ B <_ 1) then the rule for unit X may
. . , ... ,, n x(tK <B continue fightingbe simply written as: If (1 - —-—
-) ._ , j- . , . . 3 .L
-* x >B stOD righting
o — 3 3
An assigned breakpoint B might never be reached exactly
because casualties occur in a discrete manner, and this is
the reasoning for the >_ sign in the stopping rule. Asso-
ciated with this type of model are break curves. Figures 1
and 2 are examples of two types of break curves [Ref . 13]
.
Figure 1 is a deterministic break curve and consists of a
step function at a casualty fraction value of .2. This
implies that with certainty of probability equal to 1.0 that
the unit will stop fighting (or reach its breakpoint) when
x (t)(1 - —-—-) >_ .2. The break curve in Figure 3 is stochastic
o






























Figure 2. A Stochastic Break Curve
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will stop fighting as its casualty fraction becomes larger.
Both types of break curves provide guidance for the assign-
ment of breakpoints to combating units. Of course, the
shape of a unit's break curve is based on an estimation of
the units tendency to stop fighting as its fractional
casualty values change. An important aspect of the break
curve model is that a unit's breakpoint is determined by
only one variable (fractional casualties) . The rationale
for such a model is that a unit becomes less effective as
its casualty fraction increases and that there is a speci-
fied effectiveness level at which the unit will elect to
stop fighting. The usefulness of the break curve model is
derived from the fact that the number of casualties through-
out a battle is relatively easy to obtain from most combat
models. The break curve model then appears to be both
logical and mathematically tractable. In order to be a
good predictive model, however, the model should be valid.
In other words, the model should reflect conditions as they
exist in actual combat. Validating any combat model is
almost an impossible task at the present state of art. The
reasons are quite obvious and much too numerous to list here
The results of two attempts to validate break curve models
are discussed below.
C. VALIDITY OF BREAK CURVE MODELS
In testing for the validity of a combat model one is
almost entirely reliant on data from past conflicts to the
extent that the data exists. Even if the collected data
17

tends to support the hypothesis purported by the model then
the statistical questions of reliability, sampling tech-
niques, homogenity, etc. arise and tend to cast shadows
of doubt on the conclusions. Granted that doubt still
remains in any conclusions on combat model validity, several
people have tested actual combat data to see if it supported
the break curve models. Clark [Ref. 8] gathered combat data
from World War II to see if a deterministic break curve was
applicable to participating combat units. Two of Clark's
conclusions were:
1. The statement that a unit can be considered no longer
combat effective when it has suffered a specific casualty
percentage is a gross oversimplification not supported by
combat data.
2. The very wide individual differences in the ability
of infantry battalions to carry out a given mission
cannot be accounted for in terms of casualties alone, no
matter how the data are presented.
An excellent study was done by Helmbold [Ref. 13] to
test the validity of a stochastic break curve model. A brief
description of the assumptions, procedures, and conclusions
are worthwhile. Helmbold postulated the following hypotheses
1. The breakpoint for each side is a random variable
from some probability distribution and is independent of the
opposing side's breakpoint. Prior to a battle each side
randomly and independently chooses a casualty fraction value
at which it will withdraw (or break) from the battle. The
battle continues until one side reaches its breakpoint.
2. The break curves for each side are generally appli-




3. The casualties on side X (the attacker) and side Y
(the defender) are related in a rnonotonic increasing manner
by some function 0. If f (t) and f (t) are the fraction
x y
of casualties on side X and Y respectively at some time t
after the start of the battle then f (t) = [f (t) ]
.
x y
Hypothesis (3) necessarily limits Helmbold's conclusions
to the case of a deterministic relationship between X and Y
casualties. One such case might be a casualty process
described by Lanchester's equations that model aimed fire
("square law"). It is also important to note that is a
rnonotonic increasing function and will have a unique inverse
. Helmbold then developed [Ref. 13] the following two
relationships between conditional probabilities:
1. Axx (q) = tyx [^
_1
(q)]
2. £yy (q) = Axy [ij> (q) ] ,
where
£xx^ = P (f < q I W ) ,x ^ ' x
f. = factional casualties for side i, i = X,Y,
l
W. = Side i wins. i = X,Y,
l
< q < 1,
yx (q) = P(f < q J Wx ), iMq) = min [0 (q) ,l] where





< q ] W ) ,
xy (q) = P(f
x
< q | W )
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Knowing formulae (1) and (2) Helmbold was able to determine
\p (q) and ip (q) by plotting actual historical combat data.























Figure 3. Casualty Fraction Distribution in
Battles Won by Attacker (X)
.
When data on all battles is collected it is first broken
down into battles won by attacker (X) and battles won by
defender (Y) . Under each of these two categories the
battles are listed according to percentage of casualties for
X and percentage of casualties for Y. By tabulating the
data in this manner it is possible to plot the cumulative
distribution functions shown in Figures 3 and 4. Notice in
the figures that the winner's CDF should plot above and to
the left of the loser's CDF. For any probability value it
is possible to read values of q and ip . . from Figure 1 and

























t Yy(q2) = £xy(i> {q2) )
(q2)
Figure 4. Casualty Fraction Distribution in
Battles Won by Defender (Y)
.
numerous probability values it is possible to estimate the
functions \p and ty . When \p and \p are plotted for argu-
ment values between and 1 the resulting plot should
closely resemble that of a function and its inverse. An
example of a function and its inverse plotted between and
1 is given in Figure 5. The inverse function should be a
mirror image of the function in the 45 degree line through
the origin.
When Helmbold plotted the actual historical data he
found that tp and \p "~ did not demonstrate a true inverse
functional relationship. With this motivation Helmbold
made the following conclusion: "Consequently, it seems that
the soundness of models of combat that make essential use












- Figure 5. An Example of inverse
Functional Relationship
better theoretical understanding of the battle termination
process is obtained."
In reviewing Helmbold's study one might postulate
several reasons why historical data does not support the
three breakpoint hypotheses. The first and most obvious
reason is that one or more of the hypotheses are not true.
For example, it is possible that the breakpoints of X and Y
forces are not independent but depend on some variable such
as force ratio. The possibility also exists that there is
no functional relationship between X and Y casualties (i.e.,
casualties occur randomly) . Even if the hypotheses are
accepted as true there are still numerous possible reasons




1. It is possible that the casualty data from each
battle is, at best, a gross estimate; although, this is
partially compensated for by the large (1080) sample of
battles if one can assume that the mean error of estimation
is near zero.
2. It is possible that the two sides in the battle
should not have been classified as attacker and defender.
For example, other classifications might have been larger
force vs. smaller force or most combat experienced force
vs. least combat experienced force. The latter classifica-
tion would possibly be quite difficult.
3. It is possible that an exogenous variable such as
time dictates that the sample of battles be drawn from the
same time period. The rationale might be that military
doctrine and hardware change so drastically over time that
it is not proper to include all battles in one population.
The possibilities listed above are by no means exhaustive.
They are listed only to illustrate possible additional con-
siderations in Helmbold's study and will not be investigated
further.
D. ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE
If it is true that present breakpoint models that are
based on casualty fractions are not valid then there are
essentially two alternatives available. One might attempt
to modify existing models, or one might attempt to develop
new models. Helmbold [Ref. 13] suggested three possible
23

modifications to the breakpoint models that are currently
being used. He concluded that none of the modifications
were satisfactory to the extent that they would be desirable
breakpoint models. Naturally, the possibilities for further
modifications are still open and should not be completely
disregarded.
At this point in time, however, it seemed appropriate to
develop a new model based on a different approach. In look-
ing for a new approach it was important to become as familiar
as possible with the actual process that was being modeled.
Primarily there were three sources of information available
from which one could gain familiarity with the breakpoint
process. They were personal experience, subjective opinions
from military personnel, and the literature. After evalua-
tion of information available it was concluded that the
breakpoint process is some type of decision-making process
and should be modeled as such.
24

III. APPROACHES TO MODELLING THE BREAKPOINT
AS A DECISION PROCESS
In all battles the commanders of participating units are
forced to make decisions in the face of uncertainty. There
is virtually no possibility that a commander could predict
with certainty the state of nature that might exist at some
future time in the course of the battle. The reasons for
this are obvious: there are too many variables required to
describe the state of nature completely/ and the values
assumed by many of the variables are stochastic rather than
deterministic
.
A decision process under uncertainty might be described
briefly in the following manner. There are a number of
courses of action from which the decision maker (i.e. com-
mander) must choose one. Associated with each course of
action are possible consequences. The decision maker must
determine from pre-selected criteria the desirability of
obtaining each consequence. The course of action chosen by
the decision maker will be based on both the desirability
and probability of obtaining the associated consequences.
The risk associated with choosing a course of action may be
thought of as the probability of obtaining undesirable
consequences
.
For the military decision maker there are many problems
associated with the process described above. One may not
always be able to execute a course of action according to
25

plan, but in many situations the chosen course of action is
revised during execution because of unexpected events. All
the consequences associated with a course of action are not
known and therefore not considered. Even if the consequences
are considered, it is very difficult to assign the prob-
abilities of obtaining them. Many times the military deci-
sion maker must consider a course of action not only in terms
of consequences but also in terms of future courses of
action. Of course, the commander in battle faces many other
problems such as time constraints, communication failures,
confusion, etc.
Despite all the problems associated with military
decision making under uncertainty, research has been con-
ducted in this area, and some limited conclusions have been
reached. In a study done by Krumm, Robins, and Ryan [Ref.
19] subjects were tested on their ability to make tactical
military decisions. It was hypothesized that the quality
of tactical military decision making is a function of the
decision maker's experience, his ability, his decision
process pattern, and the facts made available to him. The
results of the study confirmed this hypothesis. When scores
were assigned to the four variables listed above and
subjects were tested on their decision making ability the
predictor variable which alone accounted for nearly half
the common variance among test scores was the subject's
decision process pattern. The implications of the results
led the authors to state [Ref. 19] "If indeed the manner in
26

which a subject approaches a problem situation (his decision
process pattern) is related to decision quality, then such
a relationship should hold for a variety of problem situa-
tions. And if such generalization is supported, then it
should be possible to improve decision quality in general by
educating individuals in systematic problem solving tech-
niques." These conclusions suggest that prior training in
problem solving techniques influences the quality of
decisions made by military commanders.
The U.S. military services provide both doctrine and
guidance for making sound military decisions, and it is
assumed that military services of other nations provide the
same. Of course, to assume that one could model an indi-
vidual's decision process pattern based strictly on doctrine
and guidance provided him by his military service is not
very realistic. However, there are certain aspects of
military doctrine which should provide some insight into
the commander's decision process pattern. For example the
doctrine stating that "the accomplishment of the mission is
most important" should influence a commander's decisions to
the extent that he will decide on those courses of action
which he feels will result in accomplishment of the mission.
On the other hand, one sould not expect the commander to
decide on courses of action which he felt would minimize
casualties but result in failure of the mission. This was
a simple example but it shou serve to illustrate how know-
ledge of doctrine and past training might provide some
27

insight into the military decision process. Indeed it would
be negligent to ignore the effects of doctrine and past
training when considering a model that involved military
decision making.
A. ANALYSIS OF MILITARY DECISION MAKING
At this point it will be beneficial to discuss in
general terms some of the doctrine and guidance which might
affect the decisions made by a U.S. Infantry commander.
When assigned a mission it is necessary for the commander to
operationally define the mission in terms of concrete and
well-defined objectives. Then all efforts and assets are
directed toward the objectives. Some typical objectives
might be to capture and secure a piece of terrain or to fix
the enemy in place by denying him freedom of movement. The
The procedure used by the commander to designate objectives
and decide on courses of action which will attain those
objectives is referred to as "the estimate of the situation"




The first step involves studying the mission to
determine what tasks must be performed to accomplish it.
2 Situation and Courses of Action
The second step involves gathering in an orderly
manner all facts which are relevant to the situation. If
facts are not available then logical assumptions are made.
All information gathered is used to determine factors which
may affect any possible course of action, to determine
28

opposing conditions which may adversely affect the accomp-




Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action
The third step involves determining probable events
that will occur during the execution of courses of action
when faced with opposing conditions.
4 Comparison of Own Courses of Action
The fourth step involves evaluating the advantages
and disadvantages of each course of action and choosing
those courses of action which promise to be most successful
in accomplishing the mission.
5 Decision
The fifth step involves choosing a course of action
and translating it into a complete statement as to the
action to be taken.
In both analyzing such a situation and postulating approaches
to modeling the situation it is necessary not only to limit
the scope but also to make certain assumptions. This
allows one to formulate a situation which is somewhat more
mathematically tractable.
Consider a situation in which a friendly and enemy
infantry company are operating independently in some sector
of terrain. Suppose that both companies have been given the
general mission of locating and destroying any opposing
forces in the particular sector of terrain. Further assume
that there is a meeting engagement between the two companies.
29

This implies that the element of surprise is equally dis-
tributed between the two companies. At this point the follow-
ing questions seem appropriate: Will both units elect to
commit themselves to a decisive engagement at the time of
initial contact? If both units commit themselves how long
will the battle last? Finally, at what point, if ever, in
the battle will one side elect to v/ithdraw from the battle-
field and leave the other side in control?
Before attempting to provide answers for the above
questions it is beneficial to analyze, in a formal manner,
the decision processes of both commanders. The analysis
required the identification of the decision variables, the
relevant state variables, the relationship between state
and decision variables, and the decision criteria. Possibly
the first decision to be made by the commander is whether
or not to decisively engage the enemy unit upon initial
contact. The decision the commander makes may be thought
of as the outcome of a single Bernoulli trial: the variable
can assume only one of two possible values corresponding to
the decision to decisively engage and the decision not to
decisively engage. The variable will assume the two values
with probability p and 1-p respectively. The value of p is
not known and must be estimated.
The probability that the commander will decide upon
decisive engagement is postulated to be a conditional
probability which is conditioned on values assumed by rele-
vant state variables. In other words, the probability that
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the commander will decide to decisively engage the enemy
will not always be the same in every situation but will
change according to his perception of relevant state vari-
ables. For example one would not expect the probability
of a company commander deciding to engage an enemy squad to
be the same probability of deciding to engage an enemy
battalion when the commander was aware of the size of the
enemy units. In the example relative size of the enemy force
would be a relevant state variable since it is used to
describe the state of an existing system. The state of
the system might be thought of as "the minimum amount of
present information about the history of the system which
allows one to predict the effect of the past upon the
future" [Ref. 34].
The first problem is to attempt to identify the variables
which describe the state of the system. For example in some
tactical situations the actions of adjacent friendly units
must be considered as a state variable but in other situa-
tions, such as the meeting engagement described above/ there
are no adjacent friendly units to be considered. If one
can successfully list all state variables to be considered
then the problem becomes one of determining the degree of
importance of those variables. For example a state variable
such as traf ficability of terrain might be relevant for an
attacking tank unit but might not be so relevant for an air
mobile assault. At first glance one might conclude that iden-
tification and classification of all relevant state variables
is an impossible task. In full context the conclusion might
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be justified, however a general knowledge of the tactical
situation and reliance on military doctrine and expertese
may permit some of the relevant state variables to be
identified.
In the meeting engagement example some of the relevant
state variables which could influence the probability of
either commander deciding on decisive engagement are the
mission of the unit, the perception of relative force size,
the relative tactical posture of opposing forces, the amount
of ammunition remaining, and the ability to communicate with
subordinate units. In the example the state variable which
should have the most influence on the commander's decision
to decisively engage the enemy is the mission to locate and
destroy all enemy forces in the area. Of course, if one
company had almost no ammunition remaining and its platoons
were separated by long distances then the commander might
decide to wait until a later time to become decisively
engaged.
The state variables describe the state of nature at
any point in time, and the value of any particular state
variable might or might not be relevant to the commander's
decision process. According to U.S. Army doctrine the state
variables which should be relevant are those state variables
influencing the unit's capability to perform the mission.
The same statement might not generally be applicable to all
other armies in all tactical situations because of differences
•in doctrine, training and motivation. In such cases the
3 2

relevant state variables would have to be determined accord-
ingly. An example might be an army whose doctrine stated
that a force ratio of at least three to one must be estab-
lsihed before decisive engagement. In this case force ratio
would be the important state variable that determined the
commander's decision criterion.
In order to identify the relevant state variables in
combat one must have as a minimum general knowledge of the
tactical situation and the doctrine of units involved.
This leads into the next problem area which is determining
the relationship between the relevant state variables, the
decision criteria, and the decision variables. As mentioned
previously any existing relationship between state and
decision variables must be established within the context
of a generally known tactical situation and doctrine.
Assuming that accomplishment of the mission was the overriding
decision criterion in the meeting engagement of the two
companies which were operating independently and further
assuming that both commanders elected to decisively engage
the enemy then the relevant state variables become those that
affect the capability to accomplish the mission. This
implies that the extent to which a state variable is rele-
vant is the degree to which it will influence the unit's
capability to accomplish its mission.
Whether or not a unit was capable of mission accomplish-
ment can be determined only after the fact, but during a
mission it is possible to subjectively estimate whether or
3 3

not a unit is capable of accomplishing its mission. Such an
estimate could be based on observations of the values of
the relevant state variables which affect unit capability
and predicting success or failure. A prediction of failure
would hypothesize that at some time in the future the unit
would become completely noncapable of mission accomplish-
ment. Assuming that a commander is primarily concerned
with mission accomplishment and that he constantly assesses
his unit's capability to accomplish the mission then the
relationship between state and decision variables becomes
clearer. The observed values of the relevant state variables
provide an estimation of the unit's capability, and the
estimation of the unit's capability influences the comman-
der's decision. For example a relevant state variable such
as ammunition remaining is observed to be zero. The comman-
der estimates that his unit is not capable of mission
accomplishment and therefore decides to withdraw his unit
from the battlefield. Usually the case is never as simple
as the example, but the relationship is the important con-
cept to be stressed.
In the example of the two companies which experienced a
meeting engagement it should be appropriate now to discuss
when the battle might end and with what results. Clearly
the battle would end if one of the companies were annihilated
or if both sides simultaneously withdrew from the battle-
field. The case of interest however is the one in which one
•company withdraws and leaves the other company in control
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of the battlefield. In light of previous discussion it is
postulated that a commander would decide to withdraw (i.e.,
reach the breakpoint) when he estimated that his unit was
no longer capable of accomplishing its mission. In other
words the decision criterion is the commander's estimate of
his unit's capability. As long as the commander estimates
that his unit is capable of accomplishing the mission he
will continue to engage the enemy.
The exact process by which a commander estimates the
unit's capability is naturally very complex and differs from
individual to individual, but there are common steps in the
process which might be analyzed. For instance the estimated
values of relevant state variables contribute in estimating
capability. The commander must also predict future values
of the relevant state variables based on past and present
observations in order to visualize the final outcome of the
battle. For example, if the commander observes that 60%
of the people in his unit are casualties and his unit has
been taking casualties at the rate of 1% of the initial
force per minute then he would have good reason to estimate
that his unit would be annihilated in forty minutes provided
all other state variables remained constant. The important
point to be emphasized is that the commander's estimate of
the unit's capability was not only based on present values
of relevant state variables but also on past and predicted
values. This might suggest that the existence of trends in




Of course the commander does not make his estimate of
the unit's capability based entirely on observations of
changing state variables. He is not always capable of
observing all relevant state variables , and he is aware
that his perception of values of state variables might differ
drastically from the true values. This leads to reliance on
such factors as past experience and intuition for making
estimates on unit capability. Such factors are difficult
to quantify, and it will be assumed in later development
that estimates of unit capability are made strictly from
estimated values of relevant state variables. There are
many state variables which could possibly influence a unit's
capability to perform its mission. The values of some of
the variables are relatively easy to quantify while others
are almost impossible to quantify. A list of some of the
factors that might be considered by a commander when esti-
mating the unit's capability is as follows:
1. Mission and associated objectives
2. Number of casualties and number of key personnel who
are casualties
3. Rate at which casualties are occurring
4. Availability of critical supplies
5. Availability of communications with subordinate units
and higher HQs
6. Force ratio of friendly and enemy combatants




8. Availability of intelligence on enemy intentions
9. Training and experience level of friendly combatants
10. Fatigue and motivation
11. Proportion of reserves committed
12. Status of adjacent units
13. Weather and terrain conditions
14. Availability of reinforcements and supporting fires
15. Availability of means to evacuate and treat casualties
The list above is by no means exhaustive/ and the variables
listed are not all independent since the change in the value
of one variable could necessarily mean a change in value of
another variable. The list does illustrate the fact that
there are numerous state variables which could be relevant
in estimating a unit's capability for mission accomplishment.
In the meeting engagement example the company commander
woudl monitor numerous state variables and continually
evaluate the relative effectiveness of the two opposing
companies. Based on predicted changes in values of the
state variables the commander would estimate the probability
that the unit was capable of accomplishing the mission. If
the commander estimated that there was a relatively low
probability of mission accomplishment then he might consider
three alternative courses of action. The first alternative
would be to continue the mission at all costs. The second
would be to continue the mission for a period of time, make
another estimate, and consider the possible courses of
action again. The third would be to break contact with the
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enemy and withdraw from the battlefield. This process is
analagous to that of sequential testing in which a tester
either accepts or rejects a given hypothesis or elects to
continue testing until more information is available. If
the battle progressed until the commander estimated that
there was virtually zero probability of mission accomplish-
ment then at some point in time he would be faced with
deciding on essentially two courses of action. He could
decide to continue the mission until annihilation or with-
drawal from the battlefield. If one assumes that accomplish-
ment of the mission was important to both companies in the
meeting engagement example and at some, point in time during
the battle one of the companies decided to withdraw from the
battlefield, then the company that withdrew is said to have
reached its breakpoint.
There are several possible approaches that could be
taken to model a unit's breakpoint as a rational decision
process. One could assume that the combat dynamics were
unknown and that the decision to "break" was a result of
estimating the values of state variables and projecting
those estimates into the future. On the other hand, one
could assume that a model for the combat dynamics was
generally applicable but that certain parameters in the
model were unknown. The decision to "break" could be based
on estimates of the unknown parameters and projections of
those estimates into the future. In any approach that is
taken one should not neglect to consider the fundamentals
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of military decision making and the types of combat situa-
tions which adapt themselves to the possible existence of
breakpoints. In the next sections two general approaches
to modelling the breakpoint as a battle termination decision
will be discussed.
B. FIRST APPROACH: EXTRAPOLATION OF OBSERVATIONS
WITH NO ASSUMPTION ABOUT COMBAT DYNAMICS
In describing an approach to modelling the breakpoint as
a result of extrapolation of empirical observations the
following assumptions are applicable.
1. Decisions are based on the perception of a future
state.
2. The decision maker has perfect knowledge of relevant
state variables.
3. The relevant state variables completely describe the
state space.
4. A functional relationship exists between the state
variables and a unit's capability to perform a specific task.
5. The combat dynamics are unknown.
The implication of this type of approach is that the state
variables or a function of these is the decision criterion
which causes a commander to stop fighting. The justification
for this is that changes in state variables cause changes in
a unit's capability to perform specified tasks.
At this point it is useful to introduce the concept of a
capability index denoted by CI. The values of CI are restric-
ted such that < CI < 1.0. When CI = 1.0 the state space
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is assumed to be ideally favorable for accomplishing a task.
This implies that there is no enemy resistance, the friendly
unit is functioning perfectly, the weather and terrain are
ideal, etc. Naturally the CI value of exactly 1.0 is more
of an abstraction than a reality, but it does provide an
origin for a scale to measure relative capability. When
CI = 1.0 the probability of accomplishing the task in the
most desirable manner is unity. This, of course, implies
that the probability of mission accomplishment is also unity
If CI = the state space is assumed to be ideally unfavor-
able for accomplishing a task. This implies that conditions
are such that the probability of accomplishing the task is
zero. A value of CI = would be appropriate for a unit
which had been completely annihilated.
From assumptions three and four it is possible to
express CI as:
CI = (X. (t ) ) i = 1, . . . ,Kin
where undefined function and X. (t ) is the relevant statein
variable i at time t . By using the variable t it is
n * J n
assumed the time axis is divided into equal segments and a
discrete value is observed at the end of the n interval.
From Assumption 1 it is necessary not only to obtain a value
of CI at time t but also to obtain an estimated value of CI
n
at some time t
,
-. in the future. An expression for the
estimate of CI is denoted as CI = (X. (t ,-,)).
i n+1
One method for obtaining estimated values for the state
variables is exponential smoothing. Exponential smoothing
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is appropriate for the following reasons:
1. Estimates are based on past and present observations
2. The method allows most recent observations to be
weighed heavily in formulating estimates.
3. The method does not require an exact time history to
be carried forward.
The exponential smoothing model to be used is
X. (t ) = A. (t ) + E. (t) ,in in l
where
X. (t ) = rate of change of X. per time period
= X. (t ) - X. (t ,)
,
in l n-1
A. (t ) = constant at t ,in n
and
E. (t) = random noise (error) with zero mean.
From Assumption 5 the value of A. (t ,,) is not known andc i n+1
must be estimated. This might be accomplished by using the
smoothing function of the observations which is
S[AX. (t .,)] = A. (t ,, ) = a[tX. (t )]l n+1 l n+1 in
+ (1- a) S[£X. (t ,) ]l n-1
where a is a smoothing constant and <_ a <_ 1. A higher
value of a will assure a more rapid response to a real
change in the pattern of the observations. A smaller value
of a will assure a less rapid response. In a combat situa-
tion with changing state variables a higher value of a would
most likely be appropriate.
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An example of exponential smoothing used to predict the
change in force ratio (X/Y) is given below in Figure 6. The
























Figure 6. Actual and Estimated Force Ratios.
Assuming such a technique could be used for predicting values
of all state variables then CI could be computed if were a
known function. The determination of the functional form
for is beyond .the scope of this thesis. One would suspect
that some type of weighting scheme would be necessary to
give more weight to those state variables that were most
relevant. Also, in some cases the percentage change in
state variables during the course of the battle might be
considered a better measurement than absolute values.
42

Investigation of an explicit form for might require
evaluation of subjective data gathered from a large number
of military experts and quantitative data from field
exercises. Even then the evaluation would have to be done
in light of specific situations and doctrine. If one were
to consider only a few quantifiable state variables then
estimates for would possibly be easier to obtain. Assum-
ing that in a simple case could be specified then it would
be possible to compute CI. After finding a value for CI,
where <_ CI <_ 1, then the probability of mission accomplish-
ment can be expressed as a conditional probability, condi-
tioned on the value of CI. In some situations it is
reasonable to assume that the variable known as mission
accomplishment (MC) can assume only one of two possible
mutually exclusive values. Let a value of 1 indicate that
the mission is accomplished and a value of indicate that
the mission was not accomplished. Further it is reasonable
to assume that the Pr(MC = 1/CI = 1) approaches unity and
Pr(MC =1 | CI = 0) approaches 0. The Pr (MC =1 | CI = z)
,
where
_< z <_ 1 , could be plotted in such a manner as that
illustrated in Figure 7.
Of course the exact curve is unknown, but the general
shape of the curve might resemble the one in Figure 7. If
a commander's primary objective in combat is mission
accomplishment then it is reasonable to assume that tactical
decisions are made in light of such an objective. This








Figure 7. The Probability of Mission Accomplishment.
its breakpoint. If the commander is convinced that the
probability of mission accomplishment was very small then he
would be more likely to withdraw his unit from the battle-
field than if he was convinced that the probability of
mission accomplishment was very high.
Figure 8 graphically illustrates the probability of a
unit reaching its breakpoint as the probability of mission
accomplishment changes. Once again the exact shape of the
actual curve is unknown, but the general shape of the curve
in Figure 8 is intuitively appealing for several reasons:
1. It illustrates low and high probabilities for reach-
ing a breakpoint when the probability of mission accomplish-
ment is respectively high and low.
2. It also illustrates a rapid change in the probability
of unit breaking when the probability of mission accomplish-


























Figure 8. The Probability that a Unit Does Not.
Reach Its Breakpoint.
curve such as the one in Figure 8 would provide a means for
determining whether or not a unit had reached its breakpoint,
The following steps outline a procedure to model the break-
point as a rational decision process based on extrapolation
of observed state variables.
1. For a given unit choose several of the most relevant
state variables based on the tactical situation and the
applicable doctrine.
2. Determine how much the unit's capability to perform
an assigned task is influenced by a change in the state
variables, and derive a function such that CI = [X. (t )].h ^ i n
As.
3. At fixed time intervals during the battle compute CI
by using exponential smoothing to predict values for (X. (t )
4. For a value of CI determine a value of P (MC = 1)
from a graph such as the one in Figure 7.
5. For a value of P (MC = 1 / CI = z) determine a value
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of P (unit does not reach its breakpoint) from a graph such
as the one in Figure 8.
6. For the value of P (unit does not reach its break-
r
point) compare a probability value obtained from a random
number generator.
7. Based on the comparison decide whether or not the
unit reached its breakpoint.
A numerical example illustrating these procedures is presented
in Appendix A. The advantages of using an approach such as
the one described above to model a unit's breakpoint are
listed below.
1. The approach allows more than one state variable to
influence a commander's decision.
2. The approach requires no prior knowledge of the
actual combat dynamics
.
3. The approach allows for decisions based on prior,
present, and predicted observations of state variables.
4. The approach is flexible in that it can be modified
to fit numerous tactical situations.
5. The approach considers the element of chance by
introducing a stochastic decision rule.
6. The approach is computationally simple and could
easily be handled by a computer.




The disadvantages of such an approach are listed below.
1. It might be very difficult to obtain an explicit
function that describes a unit's capability in terms of
the relevant state variables.
2. The approach provides a positive probability that
both sides in a battle might reach their breakpoint at the
same time. Although this is not completely unrealistic it
is a rare event.
3. The assumption that the commander has perfect
knowledge of all relevant state variables is not realistic.
4. The approach does not account for unquantifiable
state variables such as fear, morale, experience, etc.
As is the case with most approaches to modelling combat
the most difficult aspect is that of investigating the
validity of proposed models. To determine the validity of
the models hypothesized above, it would be necessary to do
more research in the area of military decision making in
combat. The specific area of research that is crucial to
justifying the proposed approach is the sensitivity of the
decision variable to changes in state variables. Such an
investigation would necessarily require that subjective data
be gathered from military commanders. One method of
gathering data might be to present general tactical situa-
tions to commanders and simulate a battle by specifying
the values of state variables at regular time intervals. At
the end of each time interval the commander would be
required to decide on either continuing the battle or
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withdrawing his unit. Each time a decision was made the
commander would be required to explain his decision in terms
of the decision criteria. This method would provide a
starting point for identifying those state variables which
the commanders considered relevant and the degree of rele-
vancy associated with each one. Of course, any conclusions
drawn from the data would be applicable only to the same
type of situations that were presented to the commanders.
Although the method described above would not serve to
validate a model it would create a sound military basis for
assigning weights to relevant state variables. An obvious
caveat in utilizing simulated combat conditions to analyze
military decision making is that decisions are made with the
realization that no real losses will occur. Since a comman-
der is not conditioned to readily admit that his unit is no
longer capable of accomplishing an assigned mission the data
gathered in any simulation would possibly reflect a bias
because of such conditioning. Any approach that required
the use of historical data to investigate the validity of
the proposed approach to modelling the breakpoint would
probably not be feasible because of data insufficiency. With
the introduction of computer-based tactical data systems on
the battlefield it could be possible in the future to acquire
more data on relevant state variables and attempts at valida-




At this point it might be appropriate to mention a
possible modification that could be inforporated into the
previous approach described above. Rather than assuming
that the combat dynamics are unknown, one could assume that
the state variables change with time according to some
known system dynamics although there is some error associ-
ated with each process. The error could arise from two
possible sources: (1) the assumed model does not adequately
describe the true process and therefore such errors might be
considered as systematic' or bias errors, and (2) actual
observations of state variables and are considered purely
random errors. In order to make an estimate of the true
process and subsequently make predictions of the future
states of the process with postulated dynamics it is neces-
sary to use a procedure generally referred to as a filtering
technique [Ref . 18] . At this point it is sufficient to
mention the availability of a technique which can be used to
estimate and predict the true state of a process which is
considered deterministic in nature. In the next section a
special type of filtering commonly known as Kalman filtering
will be discussed in the context of an assumed attrition
model.
C. SECOND APPROACH: EXTRAPOLATION BASED
ON ASSUMED COMBAT DYNAMICS
The second approach to modelling the breakpoint as a
decision process required the following assumptions:




2. The values of the attrition-rate coefficients have
been determined by considering significant tactical variables
If there were no uncertainties in the equations
describing the battle dynamics, the commander's decision on
whether or not to continue the battle would be relatively
easy to determine for any specified criteria. For example,
if Lanchester's equations for "modern warfare" were appli-
cable and the X commander stated that he would continue to
fight if and only if the opposing unit reached its break-
point before his unit was annihilated then the decision rule
could be developed in the following manner.
Let
-fit =
~ aY a^d -r£- = -bx describe the battle dynamics:
where 77 and -r=- are the rates over time at which the X anddt dt
Y forces change
,
a and b are constant attrition-rate coefficients,
and
x(t) and y(t) are X and Y forces at time t.
Solving the two differential equations simultaneously, the
time solutions are:
/ah t -/ab t
X(t) = (X -Y /aTb) - + (X_+Y /a7b) e00 2 o 2
and
/ab t -/ab t
Y(t) = (Y -X /b/a) - + (Y +X /B7a) = /00 ' 2 00 / 2
where X and Y are the forces at time t = when the comman-
o o
der of the X forces makes a decision.
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If Y is the force level at which the Y unit will reach its
breakpoint then
ab t
YBP = <VXo ^> ^~J
BP
+ (Y +X /B7a)
o o
-J*> 'BP
where t_._. = time at which Y unit reaches its breakpoint.DC






VYBP + b/aXo - Y
X /a/b - Y
o o
Using the same method the time at which the X force level










The decision rule then can be expressed in the following
manner:
Y XIf t_„ < t continue the battle.BP o
Y XIf t„_, i t do not continue the battle.BP o
The case of no uncertainties in the battle dynamics is
straightforward, and the decision rule will depend only on
the decision criteria specified by the commander.
The more important and relevant cases are those in
which there exist uncertainties. Several cases will be
considered in which different variables or parameters in
each case are stochastic in nature. The first case to be
considered is a meeting engagement between X and Y forces,
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and the commander of the X forces must decide whether or
not to decisively engage the Y forces. Assume that the mis-
sion of the X forces is of such a nature that the option of
decisive engagement is left entirely to the X commander.
This case may be thought of as a unit deciding to terminate
battle or reach its breakpoint at time t=0 . In other words,
the commander would estimate the probability of winning the
battle and base his decision on that estimation. The deci-
sion criterion would be the probability that X wins. If the
estimated probability were small then the commander would be
less likely to decide on decisive engagement with Y. Assume
once again that the model is Lanchester's equations for
"modern warfare." Further assume that the attrition-rate
coefficients are known but that X f (force level at which X
forces become completely ineffective) , Y f (force level at
which Y forces become completely ineffective) , and Y (the
initial force level of Y) are random variables with known
distributions. The probability that X wins can be developed
as follows:
dx , dy .
at





U.p = force level at which U becomes completely
ineffective, U=X,Y




P (X wins) = P (t* < t*) = P
,













+ y[bX 2 2 2J + aY^ - bXf o o
V* Yo " Vb X,
i
The above can be shown to be equivalent to:
P
r
(X wins) = P
r
[(bX 2 - aY 2 ) < (bX 2 - aY 2 )] .
Let X. = FXX and Y.. = FYY where 0<F1 <1 i = X,Yf o . f o — — '
Let Z = X /Y .
o o o





a(l-(Fy ) 2 )






v xFrom previous assumptions Z , F2 , and F are random variables
with known distributions. To find a single distribution
which would characterize the probability statement above is
difficult; however if one were to assume distributions for
v x
Z , FJ , and F and use Monte Carlo methods to estimate a
o' '
distribution for W, the P (X wins) could be obtained for
different values of a/b. This has been done and the results
are shown in Appendix B.
It is worthwhile to discuss the appropriate distribu-
v xtional forms for Z , F1 and F . If one assumes that the
o
combatants operate as units then a discrete distribution
would be appropriate for Z . For example if X is a company
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then Y might be a squad, a platoon, a company or a battalion.
This would suggest that Z = X /Y would assume only one of3 -1 o o o J
four possible values. The probabilities associated with each
of the values would require either intelligence on the general
deployment of Y forces or frequencies of unit sizes engaged
X Yin the past or both. The distributions of F and F realis-
tically should be discrete in nature but could be approx-
imated by continuous distributions when X and Y are not1 o o
extremely small. The distributions should be such that the
X Yprobability of obtaining values of F and F close to or 1
is relatively small since once units are decisively engaged
they rarely reach their breakpoint at X^ = X or X-,^ = 0.J J c BP o BP
X YSince negative values of F* and F are not feasible, distri-
butions from the gamma family might be appropriate. In any
event the P (X wins) can be calculated [Appendix B] for
different values of a/b. The P (X wins) can be used as a
factor which will determine the value of the decision
variable. For example, the X commander might specify a
criteria such that P (X wins) >_ .5 means he will always
engage and P (X wins) < .5 means that he will never engage.
This would be a deterministic decision process since a
particular value of a/b (or greater) will always insure that
P (X wins) > .5.
r —
Another decision criteria might be P (X decisively
engages Y) = P (X wins). In this case for a known value of
a/b the P (X wins) is also known, and the procedure to
decide whether or not X decisively engages Y could be made
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randomly. This procedure is indicative of a stochastic
decision process. Of course it is possible that the comman-
der might specify other criteria in formulating his decision
to engage. For example the expected loss ratio could be
Y X
significant in reaching a decision, especially if E[F ] << E[F ]
or vice versa. The decision criteria then would specify a
minimum acceptable expected loss ratio as well as an accept-
able probability of winning. Appendix B illustrates how the
expected loss ratio could be computed and incorporated into
the decision rule. The situation described above and illus-
trated in Appendix B considered a model which had three
unknown and two known parameters. The technique used to
derive appropriate decision rules is also applicable to
other analytic models with all or some of the parameters
unknown. For example, the probability of winning and the
expected loss ratio could have been computed for the above
X Y
model even ifZ.F.F.a and b were all unknown. The
o
only restricting aspect of such an approach is the capability
of assigning appropriate distributions to the unknown vari-
ables. The availability of data from past battles and
intelligence on current activities and capabilities of com-
bat units would definitely influence the capacity to develop
appropriate distributions.
It must be remembered that the previous discussion has
dealt with a method for determining the probability that a
commander would decide to engage an enemy when certain
parameters in a specified model are unknown. This could be
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considered a special case of a general combat situation where
a model is assumed but the parameters within the model are
unknown. A more general situation is a case when the com-
mander not only has to decide whether or not to initiate
battle but also has to decide how long he will continue the
battle. If a general model for the combat dynamics is
assumed, then the commander's problem would be one of esti-
mating parameters and predicting outcomes. The estimation
of parameters in the model would be based on past and present
observations of state variables by the commander.
At this point it is hypothesized that the longer the
commander observes (i.e. the more observations made at
equally spaced time intervals) the state variables, the
estimates for model parameters become closer to the true
parameter values. If one can assume that the commander
observes the true state of nature then the hypothesis above
is statistically appealing since, generally, the variance of
estimated parameters that are stable in time decreases as
sample size increases. Realistically, in battle a commander
may not have to depend on repeated observations to get an
accurate estimate for certain unknown parameters. The
reason for this is a combination of experience and obvious
cues presented. For example the size of an enemy force can
often be determined in a short period of time by noting both
the volume of fire and the organic weapon support peculiar
to specific sized units. Variables such as experience and
battle cues, however, are difficult to quantify and include
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in any type of model. For this reason the approaches for
estimation of unknown parameters and prediction of future
outcomes discussed later will not explicitly account for such
variables. If one could assume that the combat attrition
process could be described by Lanchester's equation for
"modern warfare" but that the parameters in the model were
unknown then the commander of each opposing side would try
to estimate the value of the unknown parameters in order
that he might predict future states in the battle. Of course
ultimately the commander wants to predict the final outcome
of the battle in order that he might choose an appropriate
course of action. There are several techniques that could
be used to model the estimation of unknown parameters and the
prediction of future states of the battle.
If one could assume that the general form of the combat
dynamics is known for a particular type of battle but that.
the measurements or observations of state variables are sub-
ject to random error (Gaussian) , then an appropriate tech-
nique for estimating the true state of nature and predicting
a future state of nature might be Kalman filtering [Ref. 27].
This technique gives unbiased estimators and can be considered
as a modern version of Gauss' least-squares technique. Con-
sider a dynamical system or process whose state can be charac-
terized by vector difference equation:
X(K+1) = f (X(K)K,K)
,
X(K) is an n-dimensional state vector at time K,




and f is an n-dimensional vector function.
Also consider a vector measurement equation:
X(K) = g(X(K) ,V(K) ,K)
,
Z (K) is an q-dimensional output vector at time K,
V(K) is an q-dimensional vector of random measurement
noise at time K,
and g is an q-dimensional vector function.
The model above might be used to describe state variables
changing in a discrete manner with time and observations
being made at discrete time intervals. The Kalman filtering
technique is applied to the model to give an estimate of
the state of nature at time K and a prediction of the state
of nature at time K+l. An example of how the Kalman filter
might be applied to estimate and predict the values of
parameters in Land-tester' s equations for "modern warfare" is
given in Appendix C.
The application of the Kalman Filer allows one to estimate
and predict the state of nature for a model with unknown
parameters and continually update the estimates and predic-
tions by considering the most recent observations. This
suggests that the Kalman filtering technique might be very
useful in obtaining predictions of relevant state variables
which in turn might influence decisions that are based on a
perception of the future state of nature. If one assumes
that the general manner in which the relevant state variables
change is known and that decisions are influenced by a
5 8

perception of the future then the breakpoint might be
modelled as a random decision variable whose probability of
realization varies according to predicted future states.
The decision criteria could be expressed in terms of an
estimated capability index (CI) that was explained and used
in Section III-B. This would require the same type of
probability curve that was illustrated in Figure 8.
D. PROBLEMS IN MODELLING A DECISION PROCESS
At the beginning of this section several problems
related to military decision making were discussed. The
problems associated with modelling the military decision
process are just as numerous and complex. A primary source
of all the problems is the inability to completely describe
the decision process in an operational manner such that every
aspect is clearly understood. There are certainly elements
in the process which are common to most so-called "rational"
decision makers, but individual traits and preferences are
likely to be influential to such an extent that a general-
ized description of the process is not feasible.
Although research is being conducted on tactical mili-
tary decision making [Ref . 19] , the full extent to which such
factors as prior experience and training influence the
decision process is not realized. One area of current
interest in information systems is individual preference for
different amounts and types of data when presented with a
decision task. The element of stress also influences
individuals in varying degrees to the extent some people
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become irrational when making a decision under stress. To
completely account for the factors mentioned above in a
decision model is not feasible at the present state of the
art. The attempts to gain further insight into military
decision making in combat are hampered by such things as the
availability of data, the inability of commanders to recall
concrete reasons for making certain decisions (i.e. decisions
based on feelings, hunches, etc.), and the inability to
account for the influence of personal interactions on the
battlefield. The validity of any model that postulates the
same deterministic decision process for more than one indi-
vidual would certainly be suspect in light of the problems
mentioned. Possibly a better approach would be to try to
account for individual differences in the decision process
by allowing each decision to be a random variable as was
suggested previously in the approaches to modelling a break-
point as a decision process. Hopefully, the probabilities
associated with values of the decision variable can be esti-




IV. POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF BREAKPOINT DECISION MODELS
To model the breakpoint as a decision process is intui-
tively appealing. Historically the time at which a unit has
disengaged from the enemy and withdrawn from the battlefield
has been decided by the commander of that unit. Naturally
there are exceptions, but in general disciplined units
follow instructions issued by the commander. If it is the
commander who decides when the unit has reached its break-
point then it is worthwhile to consider how he makes this
decision when establishing battle termination rules for
combat models.
A. COMPUTER SIMULATIONS
The first type of models in which the approach described
in Section III-B might be applied are computer simulations.
Extrapolation of observations with no assumption about combat
dynamics could be used as a sub-model in both low resolution,
highly aggregated simulations such as ATLAS [Ref. 17] and
high resolution simulations such as DYNTACS [Ref. 9]. The
calling sequence for the sub-model during the simulation
could be handled in several different ways. One way would
be to require the sub-model to be called at fixed time inter-
vals; another would be strictly event oriented (i.e. called
when relevant state variables changed values) : and another





Since a computer simulation is well suited for storing
large quantities of information it is capable of monitoring
the changing values of a large number of state variables.
This means that all the simulation input variables that were
quantifiable and considered relevant to the unit's capa-
bility to perform could be monitored and the unit's estimated
capability index (CI) could be computed easily by including
a routine for exponential smoothing in the software. The
formulae for computing CI would necessarily be adjusted to
account for the tactical situation and the doctrine of
opposing forces. Exact formulation of CI and the probability
of reaching a breakpoint for given values of CI might be
based on results of subjective data from military experts
and field experimentation. In any case further research is
required here. The value of the decision variable could
then be determined stochastically by using any one of
several random schemes.
It is particularly important to consider breakpoints
when one wishes to make an assessment of the final outcome
of a battle which has involved many units in sustained
combat. It is quite possible that an outcome of such a
battle is very sensitive to the termination rules imposed
on participating units. This could be verified by varying
the termination rules for several runs of the simulation and
comparing final outcomes. One advantage of using a decision
type approach to determine breakpoints is that one is forced
to constantly monitor the state of nature described by the
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state variables. This could prevent unrealistic events such
as a unit continuing to fight for two hours without any
ammunition. In general computer simulations would be highly
adaptive to including a sub-model of battle termination based
on a stochastic decision process.
B. ANALYTIC MODELS
In a deterministic model the outcomes at various phases
of battle can be determined exactly before the battle begins.
Establishing breakpoint termination rules involves only the
specification of appropriate decision criteria. In other
words, no new information is gained through observing the
battle process over time, and the prediction of future states
in the battle will be realized exactly. The specification
of breakpoint decision criteria can be based on the desir-
ability of a realized final outcome of the battle. This of
course is not realistic and implies that an all or nothing
tactic would be optimal if a specific set of results were
acceptable and all others unacceptable. The decision pro-
cess under complete certainty is not very applicable to a
realistic decision making environment such as land combat.
If one considers a more realistic situation in which
there is uncertainty in a model, then the modelling of a
unit's breakpoint becomes more involved. The commander's
decision criteria often rely on estimates of unknown vari-
ables or parameters , and predictions of outcomes which may
or may not be realized. In combat situations where a general
type of analytical model is assumed to be applicable but the
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values of some or all of the parameters are not known and
must be estimated from observations , a technique such as
Kalman filtering might be very useful for modelling a com-
mander's estimations and predictions. The estimations and
predictions obtained through Kalman filtering then could be
used to form the basis for a commander's decision, and one
could essentially combine estimation with optimization of
battle outcome. This might be accomplished by using the
predicted values of relevant state variables to estimate a
predicted capability index (CI) and further, determine the
probability of the unit reaching its breakpoint. The
rationale is the same as the approach described in Section
III-B, but the technique for obtaining predictions is
different, and one is not forced to assume that the decision
maker's observations correspond exactly with the true state
of nature.
When using a filtering technique such as the Kalman
filter, it is desirable to use a computer as a computational
aid. With the use of a computer and Kalman filtering one
could develop an adaptive sub-model (with stochastic
elements) for battle termination.
C. PLANNING MILITARY OPEPATIONS
In planning for any military operation one would like to
know how much resistance the enemy will offer in order to
allocate resources accordingly. This requires one to esti-
mate when the enemy will reach a breakpoint (i.e. the dura-
tion of the battle) and what factors will cause it. If good
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predictive models of breakpoints can be developed the resource
allocation problem should become less complex. In order to
develop good breakpoint models the process by which a unit
reaches its breakpoint should be understood more clearly and
then modelled accordingly. The approach of modelling the
breakpoint as a stochastic decision process based on the
commander's estimate of the unit's capability to perform its
mission is recommended as a possible approach. If adequate
models can be developed from this approach then the applica-




The primary reason for suggesting that new approaches
for modelling the breakpoint are needed is the importance of
battle termination sub-models in: (1) determining outcomes
in large unit combat models, and (2) optimizing time-
sequential tactical decisions. The intent of this analysis
has been to postulate alternate approaches to modelling a
breakpoint and to suggest reasons why previous approaches
were not adequate. It is certainly not disputed that
casualties are a very important consideration in determining
breakpoints, but it is felt that any good predictive model
must consider other state variables as well.
Another important point in considering a model for break-
points is the extent to which a unit's actions are influenced
by the commander's decisions. If it is true that the com-
mander decides when the unit should stop fighting and with-
draw from the battlefield, then it is reasonable to investi-
gate possible reasons and the criteria on which the commander
bases his decision. It has been postulated in this analysis
that one of the primary reasons a commander might decide to
stop fighting and withdraw from the battlefield is a conclu-
sion, reached by estimation and prediction, that the unit is
no longer capable of accomplishing its mission. This is
stated without evidence but is based on prevailing doctrine




In this thesis the concept of a unit's breakpoint has
been investigated with emphasis on breakpoints of relatively
small infantry units. The problems with models that deter-
mine a unit's breakpoint strictly from fractional casualties
were discussed, and reasons were given for suggesting new
possible approaches to modelling the breakpoint. The
rationale for modelling the breakpoint as a decision process
was discussed and two approaches for such modelling of the
breakpoint were proposed. The first approach was postulated
in the context of unknown battle dynamics. The second
approach assumed that the general combat process was known
but that there existed some uncertainties in the model.
Specific examples of both approaches were presented. Pos-
sible applications for models developed from the approaches





MI EXAMPLE OF APPROACH 1
The following example is a simplified illustration of
how one could model the breakpoint of a unit by utilizing
the approach described in Section III- . Consider a scenario
in which two opposing infantry companies have a meeting
engagement. Both companies are operating independently, and
there are no other units in the area. The mission of both
units is to search for and destroy any opposing units in the
area. Assume neither side has access to any outside support
for the duration of the battle. The terrain and weather are
equally favorable to both units. Assume for simplicity that
the commander of Company X has identified three relevant
state variables which will affect his capability to destroy
the opposing Company Y. Let the three state variables be
denoted as
:
X, = force ratio (X/Y)
and
Xy = percentage of X force that is capable of
maneuvering
X~ = relative tactical posture of X forces compared
with tactical posture of Y forces.
Let the X commander's capability to perform the assigned
mission assume the following functional form:
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where u = a predicted value of u. From the above formulation
it can be seen that the X commander considers X, to be the
most relevant variable in determining his capability to
accomplish the task defined by his mission. Assume that the
X commander observes the true value of X,,X„,X, at equal
intervals of five minutes. At the time of each observation
he calculates the average change of each state variable over
the time interval between observations and predicts future
values of the state variables. Based on the predicted values
of X, ,Xp, and X-, he calculates CI. Suppose that initially
X,=Xp=X-.=l. This implies that the X commander initially
estimates CI = .727. Assume that during the first thirty
minutes of battle the actual and predicted changes in X, ,X
? ,
and X„ are those shown in Figure 9. At the end of each time
interval the X commander computes CI for the next future
time interval, and for each value of CI there is an associated
probability that the commander will decide that the unit will
no longer be capable of mission accomplishment and that the
best course of action is to withdraw from the battlefield.
Assume that the probability of Unit X reaching a breakpoint
for all values less than or equal to CI is the cumulative
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NOTE: Predicted values were obtained by using exponential
smoothing with a smoothing constant a = .90.
Figure 9. Observed and Predicted Changes in Relevant State Variables
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Figure 10. The Probability that Unit X Reaches a Breakpoint
For the first thirty minutes of the battle between X and Y
forces the probabilities that Unit X reached its breakpoint
at the end of any time interval are shown below in Figure 11



















Assuming that the decision at the end of any time interval
is independent of all previous decisions then one can use a
random scheme to determine whether or not the X commander
decided to withdraw at each time interval. The same type of
procedure can be used for determining whether or not unit Y
reaches its breakpoint. Of course unit Y might have dif-
ferent relevant state variables, a different formula for
computing CI, different probabilities of reaching a break-
point when CI < X, and different time intervals at which
decisions are made.
This example was not presented to model a realistic
situation but rather to illustrate a procedure that could
be used to determine breakpoints when the general form of
battle dynamics is unknown and all information is gained




THE DECISION TO DECISIVELY ENGAGE AN ENEMY FORCE
From Section II-D the probability that X wins was
expressed as the following:
Pr [X wins] = 1-Pr ^44 <v 2 < -»1-(F*)^ ° = l-Pr(W<a/b)
For a specific case assume the destributions of the random
X Y
variables F ,F and Z can be approximately described as the
following:
X <




_tdt X > 0,
and
Pr (F < X|10) -«
if
X <






X YThe distributions of F and F were approximated by gamma
distributions with different parameters for each distribu-
tion. The distribution of W was not known but could be
found approximately by using a monte carlo technique. The
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cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for the three random
variables were plotted and three random numbers were drawn
from a uniform (0,1) distribution. Then by knowing the
probability value associated with each of the random vari-
ables the corresponding argument value could be read from
the plot of the CDF. Of course, a value for W could then be
computed. A special provision was necessarily needed to
Y x
assure that the values of F and F were never greater than
V
or equal to 1.0. This required the distributions of F and
F be truncated at X = 9.9999... . Ten thousand values were
found for W and plotted on a histogram. The frequency plot
and CDF for W are shown in Figures 12 and 13 respectively
for a range of arguments values from to 3.0.
Given the distribution in Figure 12 it is very easy to
compute the Pr (X wins) for different values of a/b. For
example when a/b = 1.0 the Pr (X wins) = 1-.69 = 0.31.
Knowing the Pr (X wins) two decision rules for decisive
engagement can be postulated. The first rule is determinis-
tic in nature and requires the commander to specify a minimum
value for Pr (X wins) under which he will never engage and
over which he will always engage. For example the commander
might indicate that the Pr (X wins) = .5 is his decision
criteria for engagement. Then for a specific value of a/b
he will either always engage or never engage. A more
realistic decision procedure might specify that Pr (X
decisively engages) is proportional to Pr (X wins). For
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Pr (X wins). In this case a random scheme would be used to
determine whether or not the X commander decided to decisively
engage the Y forces.
So far the only variable considered in the decision
process has been Pr (X wins) . Realistically the commander
would possibly consider other variables. For example the
expected loss ratio IE —^ might be an important considera-
V LF J/
tion in the commander's decision process. For a case in
which the commander's decision was based on Pr (X wins)
[fx1
and E — a composite criterion would have to be determined.
_F
In other words, the commander would have to indicate the
relative importance of each variable in his decision criter-
ion. A possible mathematical formulation might be:
where




This would tend to decrease the Pr (X decisively engages)
as the relative expected losses of X increased. The decision
rule for determining whether or not the X commander decided
to decisively engage the enemy would once again be imple-
mented by some type of random scheme. Other factors might
\fx
~
also be included in the same manner as E —y was above. Of
F
course in deriving a formula for Pr (X decisively engages)





AN EXAMPLE OF THE KALMAN FILTER
This appendix presents an example of how the Kalman
filter might be used to predict future values of parameters









where a and b are constants.
Denote the variables as follows
x, = x, x = y, x-. = a, x A = b.
Then the system of differential equations may be expressed









































where z. (t) denotes a measurement of x. (t) at time t,
i = 1,2,3,4, and v. (t) denotes random noise or error in the
measurement of x. (t) at time t.
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Assume that v(t) is a random vector variable with known co-
variance and further assume that E [v(tj] = 0.
The first thing that should be done in order to apply
the Kalman filter is to transform the non-linear continuous-
time process denoted by f(x(t)) to a non-linear discrete-
time process. Define x(k+l) as a(x(k)) where a is an
n-dimensional state transition vector. Using a Taylor's
series expansion:
2









X(t) = 33: X(t) = t^1 3~ = it-- f
~ dt - dx dt 9x ~




x(t+£t) = x(t) + £tf (x(t) )+hUt) ~ (x(t) )f (x(t) )+H.O.T.
„ ~ ~ ~ dX ~ ~ ~
Now let x(t) A x(k) and x(t+£t) = x(k+l) and drop the H.O.T.
This yields the following expression:
2
3 !
x(k+l) = x(k) + /tf (x(k))+^(/t)" ^ (x(k) )f (x (k) )=a (x (k)
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If an initial estimate of x(k) [denoted by x (k) ] can be
obtained shortly after a battle has started then it is pos-
sible to express a(x(k)) as a linear function by expanding
a(x(k)) in a Taylor series about x (k) in the following
manner:
8a
x(k+l) = a(xu (k)) + dx
x°(k)

















- Atx° (k) +^£t 2x° (k) x° (k)
1
Now x(k+l) can be expressed as the following:
x(k+l) = A(k) x(k) + a(x°(k)) - A(k) x°(k).
Since x (k) is assumed known the expression for x(k+l) is in
linear form. Remembering that z(k) was also in linear form,
i.e. , z(k) = c(x(k) ) + v(k)
where c = 1 01
1 J
it is possible now to apply the extended Kalman filter to
the process defined by Lanchester ' s equations for "modern
warfare.
"
At this point it is convenient to introduce the following
notation:
x(k|k) is an estimate of x(k) given that measurements have
been made at time k.
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x(k+l|k) is a prediction of x at time k+1 given that measure-
ments have been made at time k.
G(k) is a gain matrix at time k.
P(k|k-1) = E [(x(k)-x(k)) (x(k)-x(k) T
of estimation error.
is a covariance matrix
R(k) = E v(k) v(k) T
J
For the model developed previously the appropriate Kalman
filter equations are:
1. Gain equation
G(k) = P(k|k-1) CT C P{k|k-1)CT+R(k)l -1 .
2
.
Covariance of estimation error equations
P(k|k-1) = A(k-l) P (k-l|k-l) AT (k-l).
P(k|k) = [I-G(k) C] P(kjk-l),
3 Filter update equation




x(k+l|k) = a(x(k|k) ) .
An example of how one would actually initialize and update
the Kalman filter follows. Suppose a battle had been in
progress for several minutes and the X command had made
estimates of x, ,x«,x,,x. based on previous measurements at
some time k=-l. One would expect the measurement made on
x,=x(t) to be somewhat more accurate than the estimate of
x =y(t) since the X commander is able to observe his own
casualties more closely than those of the enemy. This
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insight might provide some rationale for assigning values to
the variance associated with the measurements of x
1
, and x_
and initial values of the four state variables x. ,x„,x. ; and
x . . Now assume that these variances are known and are inde-
4
pendent and constant over time. Also assume that x (0) has
been estimated such that E [x (0)] = x(oj-l) = x, ,x~ ,x~ ,x,
.
The covariance matrices are given as follows:
2


















































The vector x(l|0) gives a prediction for x(k+l|k). When
measurements were made at time k+1 the filter would be
updated by computing x (k+1 | k+1) in the manner demonstrated
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